Michigan Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 1

1960

Contracts-Frustration of Purpose
T. Ward Chapman S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
T. W. Chapman S.Ed., Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MICH. L. REV. 98 (1960).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/4

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

98

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

COMMENTS
CONTRACTS-FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE-The contract doctrine
of frustration of purpose has evolved from cases in which a promisor seeks to avoid the duty to perform a literally unconditional
promise1 on the ground that supervening events have substantially
destroyed the value for him of the promisee's counter-performance.
In the leading case of Krell v. Henry, 2 for instance, one who had
hired a room from which he could watch the Coronation Parade
was not required to pay the promised "rent" when the parade was
cancelled due to the King's illness. The promise to pay for the
room was said to be subject to an "implied condition" that the
parade take place. Commentators have not agreed on the extent
to which this doctrine of frustration is a part of American law.3
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the doctrine in terms of
its treatment by American courts.4 Attention will be given to the
limitations which the courts have placed upon the doctrine, the
degree to which they accept the doctrine thus limited, the rationales
urged for the doctrine's acceptance or rejection, and the forms in
which relief is given in frustration situations.
J.

THE SHAPE OF THE DOCTRINE

A.

Generally

Any discussion of the substance of the doctrine of frustration11 is
perhaps best initiated by distinguishing cases involving frustration
from those involving impossibility or impracticability. The essential difference between these situations is that in a frustration situation, unlike the case of impossibility or impracticability, the basic
element is not that the frustrated party's ovm performance has
become physically impossible or difficult, but that the promisee's
counter-performance has become of little value.6 Frustration has
1 A "literally unconditional" promise is one which is not expressly conditioned upon
the non-occurrence of the subsequent frustrating event.
2 [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
8 Compare Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation,
58 CoLuM. L. REv. 287, 309 (1958), with Anderson, Frustration of Contract: A Rejected
Doctrine, 3 DE PAULL. REv. 1 (1953).
4 Occasionally reference will be made to the doctrine's use in Europe.
5 The terms "frustration" and "frustration of purpose" are used interchangeably in
this comment as names for the doctrine under discussion.
6 The factual circumstances of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration cases
may, of course, be quite the same. If war restrictions prevent a tenant from carrying on
his business, for instance, it will probably be financially difficult and perhaps impossible
for him to pay the rent. See e.g., Signal Land Corp. v. Loechner, 35 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1942). But frustration cases are different from impossibility or impracticability cases,
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been aptly characterized as involving".
an actual but not literal
failure of consideration. " 7
About half of American frustration cases have involved leases of
realty. 8 The second most prevalent type has involved the sale of
chattels.0 Other cases have involved contracts as widely varying as
a life care agreement10 and an agreement allowing the frustrated
party's guests to use the promisee's golf course.11 As to the causes
of frustration, on the other hand, this writer would estimate that
almost two-thirds of the American cases arise because unexpected
governmental action has caused circumstances subsequent to the
contract to be radically inconsistent with the frustrated party's expectations. About half of such cases are related to war regulations.12
Agencies of frustration other than the government have ranged
from fire13 to death.14 Despite this variety of fact situations it is
clear that the courts have developed certain limitations upon the
use of the doctrine applicable to any case. Before the courts will
allow a frustrated party to avail himself of the doctrine of frustration the following must be present: (1) the contract must be at least
partially executory; (2) the frustrated party's purpose in making
the contract must have been known to both parties when the contract was made; (3) this purpose must have been basically frustrated
Not all frustrated parties would find it difficult to perform if this were required. See, e.g.,
Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945). In most
impossibility and impracticability cases, furthermore, the inherent value of the promisee's
performance is as great as it ever was. See, e.g., City of Vernon v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal.2d
710, 290 P .2d 841 (1955).
7Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).
BE.g., State Realty Co. v. Greenfield, 110 Misc. 270, 181 N.Y. Supp. 511 (N.Y.C. Munic.
Ct. 1920) (tenant held not obligated to pay rent after being drafted); Burke v. San Francisco Breweries, Ltd., 21 Cal. App. 198, 131 Pac. 83 (1913) (tenant required to pay rent
although he had lost his saloon permit).
o Compare Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942), with BardoDJ
&: Oliver v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afj'd, 301 N.Y. 622,
93 N.E.2d 915 (1950), in which contrasting results were reached regarding the status of a
buyer who was unable to obtain an export permit.
10 Gold v. Salem Lutheran Home Ass'n, 53 Cal.2d 347 P .2d 687 (1959) (death
before beginning of care term held not grounds for rescission).
11 La Cumbre Golf &: Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal. 422, 271
Pac. 476 (1928) (promisor hotel held under no obligation to continue payments after the
hotel had been destroyed by fire).
12 E.g., 119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup.
Ct. 1947), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (property leased by enemy alien
padlocked). The most frustrating peacetime government action was Prohibition. For contrasting decisions on the duty of a saloon tenant to pay rent after Prohibition, see cases
cited in note 54 infra.
13 E.g., Moreland v. Credit Guide Publishing Co., 255 Mass. 469, 152 N.E. 62 (1926)
(employer required to continue paying employee although employer's place of business
destroyed).
14 See note 22 infra.
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by an event15 not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract ·was
made, the occurrence of which has not been due to the fault of the
frustrated party16 and the risk of which was not assumed by him.17
The question of the presence of these requirements is apparently
a matter for the court, and the burden of establishing their presence is upon the frustrated party.18
B.

Requirement That Contract Be Executory

Most courts do not mention the requirement that the contract
be at least partially executory, but it is clear that such a requirement
exists. In Kerr S.S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and
China19 plaintiff purchased negotiable drafts from defendant bank,
drawn on defendant's branch in Manila and made payable to plaintiff's agent in Manila. Because communications were subsequently
disrupted by war, plaintiff was unable to remit the drafts to his
Manila agent. Emphasizing the chattel characteristics of negotiable instruments the New York Court of Appeals held plaintiff
could not recover the money he had paid defendant. The court
said that plaintiff, having paid for and received delivery of a negotiable instrument ". . . cannot rescind the transfer to it because it
is impossible to use it now for the purpose for which it was
acquired." 20 The court expressly noted that it was not deciding
what result would be reached on the same facts if only a simple con15 A plea of frustration is not likely to succeed if it appears that the promisor
originally made a bad bargain. In Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1941),
the court emphasized that while it was certainly true that war regulations had severely
restricted the lessee's auto sales and service business, it appeared that he had been
unhappy with the location in question even before the restrictions and was still operating
at other locations in the city.
16 E.g., Gulf, M. & O. R. R. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 225 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1955)
(railroad required to continue paying trackage rental where it had voluntarily abandoned
the trackage for a more profitable route). Not only must the frustration not be the
promisor's fault, but also he must have attempted to defeat the frustrating effect of the
supervening event. He cannot, for instance, complain that subsequent war regulations have
destroyed a lease's value if he has not availed himself of an opportunity to apply for a
release from the government restriction. Gardiner Properties v. Samuel Leider & Son,
279 App. Div. 470, 111 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1952).
17 It is possible, of course, for the parties to have considered the risk of frustration by
the supervening event which occurred and, despite failure to deal with it expressly, have
intended either the promisee or the promisor to assume the burden of such risk. See, e.g.,
Raner v. Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927). Even though some courts feel the
doctrine of frustration is based upon relief of hardship (see note 33 infra), it is doubtful
that this rationale would be pushed far enough to excuse an intentional assumption of the
risk of the supervening event.
1s E.g., Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal.2d 45, 153 P .2d 53 (1944); Fisher v. Lohse,
181 Misc. 149, 42 N.Y.S.2d. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1943). But cf. Neuberg v. Avery F. Payne Co., 265
App. Div. 1052, 41 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1943),
19 292 N.Y. 253, 54 N.E.2d 813 (1944).
20Id. at 263, 54 N.E.2d at 817.
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tract for the payment of money or for a credit in a foreign exchange were involved.21
Thus, with only one exception knmrn to this ·writer,22 the
courts have simply assumed that a fully executed contract is not
rescindable on frustration grounds. Some cases, furthermore, hold
or suggest that frustration is not an available doctrine if the
promisee has fully performed23 or, as to sales of chattels, if he has
tendered performance.24 It is unfortunate that 'the courts have
failed to indicate why a certain degree of execution of a contract
should bar any use of the doctrine of frustration. If one grants
that there is little substantial difference between mistake and frustration, 25 it is certainly not obvious why executed contracts should
be rescindable when they involve the former and not when they
involve the latter. 26 It is probably true that in many cases the
parties themselves, had they considered the risk of the occurrence
of the frustrating event, would have put upon the frustrated party
all risk of frustration subsequent to performance. But this would
certainly not be true in every case. In Kunkel Auto Supply v.
Leech,21 for instance, defendant purchased from plaintiff certain
equipment with which he could test automobiles pursuant to a new
21 In a dissenting opinion Judge Conway argued that the contract was e.xecutory and
and therefore rescindable.
22 In Gellert v. Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n, 107 Ore. 162, 174, 214 Pac. 377, 382
(1923), a decedent purchased from defendant bank checks made payable to certain intended
donees of the decedent. The decedent died before delivering the checks to the donees.
The court allowed the estate's claim for the return of the money paid for the checks,
on the ground that " ••. under a well-established rule, money paid for a purpose which
cannot be legally accomplished because of a subsequently intervening obstacle may be
recovered." The court said the result would be the same whether the transaction was
deemed a sale of a negotiable instrument, the creation of an agency for the transfer of
money, or a contract for the sale of credit.
23 Kunkel Auto Supply Co. v. Leech, 139 Neb. 516, 298 N.W. 150 (1941). See also Wald
v. Lenox Ave.&: 140th St. Corp., 197 Misc. 773, 94 N.Y.S.2d 793 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct.), afj'd
198 Misc. 527, 102 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. T. 1950).
24 Swift Canadian Co. v. Banet, 224 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1955) (Canadian seller given
normal contract damages although U.S. buyer could not get export permit); Amtorg
Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953) (dictum);
Bardons & Oliver v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275
App. Div. 748, 88 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1949), afj'd, 301 N.Y. 622, 93 N.E.2d 915 (1950). Contra,
Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942).
2G A typical mistake situation e.xists, for e.xample, when parties to a mineral lease
have underestimated the quantity of minerals present. The lessee was relieved of his
literally unconditional promise to pay minimum royalties in Byrd v. Anderson, 207 Ky.
317, 269 S.W. 323 (1925), and Virginia Iron, Coal, & Coke Co. v. Graham, 124 Va. 692,
98 S.E. 659 (1919). Presumably, however, if the trouble resulted from an unforeseeable
collapse of the mine shaft the case would be one of frustration. Thus the essential difference between mistake and frustration is merely the time when actualities, such as the
ability to mine expected amounts, become inconsistent with the parties' assumptions. In
mistake the inconsistency e.xists at the time of contracting; in frustration it develops later.
26 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs §1557 (rev. ed. 1937).
27139 Neb. 516, 298 N.W. 150 (1941).
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statute requiring such tests. The statute was repealed, however,
before it had ever been enforced and the equipment was made
worthless to defendant. Defendant was not allowed to rescind after
delivery of the equipment, even though it is probable an agreement allowing a more fair allocation of the risk would have been
negotiated had the danger of the repeal been foreseen at the time
of the purchase. The courts, however, appear to feel strongly that
the use of the doctrine of frustration should be rather strictly
limited. Whatever its merits,28 the requirement that the contract
be at least partially executory has developed as one such limitation.

C.

Requirement of Mutually Known Purpose

Not only do all courts require that the frustrated party's purpose be known to the other party, but also some courts appear to
require that this purpose be shared to the extent that it becomes at
least partially the other party's own.29 Although it is sometimes
true that the promisee shares the frustrated party's hopes that the
latter will be able to make valuable use of what he has received
under the contract, as when the amount of a patentee's royalties
depend on how much the licensee can use the patent,30 this is not
usually the case. It is generally immaterial to a lessor, for instance,
whether the lessee can make any use of the premises as long as the
lessee can pay his rent. Courts accepting the doctrine of frustration,
however, do not refuse to apply it in such situations.31 But even·
conceding that the courts are actually requiring only that the other
party know of the frustrated party's purpose, it is still difficult to
justify the requirement. It will not do to argue that the promisor
would have required the promisee to bear the risk of the supervening event had the former known the latter's purpose, for another
28 In Kerr S.S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia, &: China, 292 N.Y. 253, 54
N.E.2d 813 (1944), discussed in Part I-B supra, the court was willing to concede that the
frustrated party's rights could tum on the purely formal difference between an executed
purchase and sale of a negotiable instrument and an executory simple contract for the payment of money.
29 E.g., Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 485, 156
N.Y. Supp. 179, 180 (1915), which speaks of the failure of the " ..• object in mutual
contemplation."
so See Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945).
It is difficult to see any significance in the fact that a promisee's purpose too has been
frustrated since he has obviously chosen to register no complaint based on such frustration.
31E.g., Hizington v. Eldred Refining Co., 235 App. Div. 486, 257 N.Y. Supp. 464 (1932)
(tenant held not obligated to pay rent after government regulations forbade his business
on premises). The requirement, as applied by the courts, is accurately said to involve the
frustration of " .•. a desired object or effect to be attained by either party." I ll=ATE•
MENT, CONTRACTS §288 (1932).
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limitation dictates that the supervening event itself not be reasonably foreseeable. The courts discussing the matter have, nevertheless, required this mutual knowledge of the frustrated party's purpose.82

D.

Requirements That the Frustration Be Basic and Not
Reasonably Foreseeable

I. Generally. The most restrictive, and most central, of the
limitations are those requiring that the frustrating event not have
been reasonably foreseeable and that the intervening event frustrate basically the promisor's purpose in entering into the contract.
These probably reflect a belief of the courts that the doctrine is
bottomed upon a policy of relieving against hardship,33 and thus
should be applied only in hard cases. A by-product of these limitations is the allocation to the promisor of the risk of any foreseeable,
but unallocated, occurrence. But the less foreseeable the event,
the less likely it is that the parties contracted with reference to it,34
and the greater the need for a court's assistance. Furthermore, the
more basic the frustration, the more reasonable it is to assume that
the parties themselves would have expressly adjusted their respective rights and duties had they thought of such a possibility.35
82 In Brown v. Oshiro, 68 Cal. App.2d 393, 156 P.2d 976 (1945), a lessee was held
obligated to continue paying rent for a hotel which had drawn seventy-five per cent of its
clientele from the Japanese-American population of Los Angeles. This clientele was lost
when the Japanese were evacuated from the area. The court emphasized that while the
tenant may have intended to operate a Japanese hotel, it did not appear that the lessor
knew of this purpose.
88 In Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 53, 153 P .2d 47, 50 (1944), frustration doctrine
is said to be ". • • akin to the doctrine of impossibility of performance • • . since both
have developed from the commercial necessity of excusing performance in cases of extreme
hardship ..••"
M"[T]he true intent of the parties was thwarted by the happening of subsequent
events ••• which were unforeseen at the time [of contracting] - a condition and situation
not within the contemplation and intention and hence unprovided for." Farlou Realty
Corp. v. Woodsam Associates, 49 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (Sup. Ct.) affd, 52 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1944),
aff'd 294 N.Y. 846, 62 N.E.2d 396 (1945). "If it [the supervening event] was foreseeable
there should have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision
gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed." Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 54,
153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944). It should perhaps be noted that when the courts ask whether an
event was "reasonably foreseeable" they are actually seeking to determine whether it
would have been reasonable at the time the contract was made to consider the risk of the
supervening event. In Farlou Realty Corp. v. "\Voodsam Associates, the lessee of a longterm lease was required to continue to pay rent although war regulations had prevented it
from building on the leased property. Expressing doubt that the possibility of such restrictions was not foreseen, the court noted that some restrictive policies were already
in effect when the lease was made, and gave considerable emphasis to the fact that the
lessee had been represented by highly qualified legal counsel.
35 In 119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123, 125, N.Y.S.2d. 744,
776 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d (1949), the doctrine was said
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2. Non-foreseeability. The courts vary in the degree of nonforeseeability of frustration required before a frustrated party will
be able to avail himself of the frustration doctrine. In Kahn v.
Wilhelm 36 the lessee of a saloon was held to be under no obligation
to pay rent after the passage of a city prohibition ordinance even
though the contract evidenced some concern of the parties over this
possibility. In Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires,3 7 on the other hand, the
court, requiring a lessee to continue to pay rent although govern~
ment war regulations had caused his business to drop 99 percent,
suggested that "war talk" prior to the war had given sufficient
warning of the possibility of such trouble. The test, however, is,
not whether the parties actually foresaw the possibility of trouble,.
but whether they reasonably should have. In Megan v. Updilur
Grain Corp. 38 the lessee of a grain elevator lost half of his busines~
as a result of a change in the governmentally-established freight
rates. In a suit by the lessor's trustee in bankruptcy both the lessee·
and lessor testified that they had expected no rate change at the
time the lease was made. Requiring the lessee to continue to pay
rent, however, the court noted that events at the time the contract
was made clearly indicated the possibility of such change and con~
eluded,". . . [T]he testimony of the men who negotiated the lease
that they did not anticipate any important change of rates was not
substantial and should have been disregarded. " 39
3. Basic Frustration. Of the various limitations which the
courts have developed the requirement that the promiser be
basically frustrated has received the most varied treatment. This
is due to the fact that a court may indirectly express the degree to
which it accepts the doctrine of frustration when it decides whether
a particular promiser has been sufficiently frustrated to justify
relieving him from his literally unconditional promise. A typical
verbal formula requires that the frustrating event must have ". . •
to be applicable " . . . where, since the formation of the contract, there has supervened
an event or circumstance of such a character that reasonable men in the position of the
parties would not have made the contract, or would not have made it without inserting
some appropriate provision, if they had known or anticipated what was going to happen."
36118 Ark. 239, 177 S.W. 403 (1915). Compare Straus v. Kazemekas, 100 Conn. 581,
124 Atl. 234 (1924).
37 25 Cal.2d 45, 153 P.2d 53 (1944).
ss 94 F.2d 551 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 305 U.S. 663 (19118).
39 Id. at 554. Can the occurrence of the precise event which the promise was intended
to prevent be deemed not reasonably foreseeable? In Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So.
862 (1933), enforcement of a restrictive covenant aimed at maintaining a neighborhood
was denied because there had been neighborhood deterioration subsequent to the making
of the covenant.
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made performance vitally different from what was reasonably to
be expected."40 But courts vary considerably in their estimates of
when performance has become "vitally different." In 20th Century
Lites v. Goodman41 the lessee of a neon sign was allowed to rescind
the lease after war regulations prevented him from lighting the
sign at night. Although the sign's block lettering made it of some
value for daytime use, the court said the sign had ceased to be the
illuminated display for which the contract called. In Popper v.
Centre Brass Works, 42 on the other hand, one who had agreed to
purchase some glass coal for use in the manufacture of imitation
fireplaces was held subject to normal contract damages when he
refused to accept delivery because unforeseen government war regulations necessitated his closing his business. Thus the shape of the
frustration doctrine is quite well defined until the core requirement, that the promisor has been basically frustrated, is considered.
Here generalization becomes difficult because intertwined with
any court's decision is the court's basic attitude toward the doctrine
of frustration itself.

II.

JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE

Any generalization regarding judicial acceptance of the doctrine must be stated in terms of the precise kinds of cases from
which the generalization has been drawn. Expressing such distinctions is important in light of disagreement among commentators on whether the doctrine is accepted in the United States.43
For example, one problem in this area has been the categorization
of cases which could be decided by reference to either of two
familiar broad classifications of legal principles such as "property
law" or "contract law." The lease is an excellent example. It can
be approached in purely "property" terms and thus conceived as
passing an estate and the risk of frustration with it. Indeed some
frustration-in-fact cases have been so decided without the mention
of a single principle of "contract law." 44 Other lease cases, on the
other hand, have been decided in terms of the frustration of pur40 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 54, 153 P .2d
H 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944).
42 180 Misc. 1028, 43 N.Y.S.2d 107 (N.Y. City Ct.
43 See note 3 supra.

47, 54 (1944).
1943).

44119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct.
1947), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (criticizing the "estate approach'');
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1955 (rev. ed. 1938). See also Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175,
146 P .2d 883 (1944).
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pose doctrine without mentioning the lease estate concept.415 The
policy of this writer has been simply to take the courts at their
word. Thus a decision purporting to rest on non-"contract" principles was considered to show nothing concerning the court's willingness to accept the "contract" doctrine of frustration of purpose.46
Nevertheless, of the holdings in frustration cases known to this
writer, twenty-nine decisions may be classified as reflecting acceptance of the doctrine of frustration. 47 Ten of these cases, however,
involved the same general fact situation of a lease for saloon purposes frustrated by subsequent Prohibition, and in six of these
cases the lessee's purposes had been totally frustrated. 48 Of the
remaining cases, five involved the same precise facts, 49 and seven
involved total frustration. 50 Most of the decisions, finally, were
45 E.g., Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 601, 126 N.Y.S. 135 (App. T. 1910) (tenant held under
no further duty to pay rent when government regulations ended his theater business). It
should be emphasized that a "contract law" approach to the problem does not necessarily
mean that the court will relieve the frustrated party. E.g., Kollsman v. Detzel, 184 Misc.
1048, 55 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945) (lessee held under a continuing obligation to
pay rent although he had been interned as an enemy alien).
46 Alternative holdings, one of which involved a "contract approach," have been here
treated. E.g., in Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944), a gasoline station
tenant was held under a continuing obligation to pay rent despite the severe effect of war
regulations upon his business. The court rested its decision upon the twin grounds that the
doctrine of frustration was inapplicable to leases since they involve the passing of an
estate, and that even if the doctrine were applicable, there was not sufficient frustration in
the case before it. For other types of case in which either of two differing broad legal
approaches are possible, see Kerr SS. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia, &
China, 292 N.Y. 253, 54 N.E.2d 813 (1944) (negotiable instruments); Osius v. Barton,
109 Fla. 556, 146 So. 862 (1933) (covenants restricting use of realty); and Banks v. Puma,
37 Cal.2d 838, 236 P.2d 369 (1951) (joint venture).
47 Cases cited in notes 48-50 infra.
48 Industrial Dev. & Land Co. v. Goldschmidt, 56 Cal. App. 507, 206 Pac. 134 (1922);
Levy v. Johnston & Hunt, 224 Ill. App. 300 (1922); Schaub v. Wright, 79 Ind. App. 56,
130 N.E. 143 (1921); Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co.,
98 Wash. 12, 167 Pac. 58 (1917); Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912);
Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, II3 S.W. 364 (1908). The remaining
Prohibition cases were Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co., 198 App. Div. 708, 191
N.Y. Supp. 59 (1921); Kaiser v. Zeigler, II5 Misc. 281, 187 N.Y. Supp. 638 (App. T. 1921);
Stratford v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 94 Wash. 125, 162 Pac. 31 (1916); Kahn v.
Wilhelm, II8 Ark. 239, 177 S.W. 403 (1915).
,
49 One who had promised to pay for advertising in a souvenir booklet for a yacht race
was frustrated when the race was cancelled after the booklets were printed. Alfred Marks
Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y.Supp. 179 (1915); Alfred
Marks Realty Co. v. "Churchills," 90 Misc. 370, 153 N.Y.Supp. 264 (App. T. 1915); Alfred
Marks Realty Co. v. Smith-Serrell Co., 154 N.Y. Supp. Il09 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Alfred Marks
Realty Co. v. Geo. Rector, 152 N.Y. Supp. II51 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 172 App. Div. 968, 156 N.Y.
Supp. 180 (1915); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Gwilliam Co., 152 N.Y. Supp. II51 (Sup. Ct.
1915).
50 Ask Mr. Foster Travel Serv. v. Tauck Tours, 181 Misc. 91, 43 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup.
Ct. 1943); Signal Land Corp. v. Loechner, 35 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942); Hizington
v. Eldred Ref. Co., 235 App. Div. 486, 257 N.Y. Supp. 464 (1932); Magner v. Mills, 137
Misc. 535, 242 N.Y.Supp 705 (N.Y. City Ct. 1930); Lacumbre Golf & Country Club v. Santa
Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal. 422, 271 Pac. 476 (1928); Gellert v. Bank of California
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not by courts of last resort. Nineteen holdings, on the other hand,
ten of which were by courts of last resort,51 reflect substantial hostility to frustration doctrine.
There seems to be no substantial correlation between the kind
of transaction or the nature of the frustrating event and the application of the doctrine of frustration. Different cases reach different
results whether the transaction is one for a lease52 or one for a sale
of chattels,53 and whether the frustration results from Prohibition54
or war. 55 Because frustration cases necessarily involve weighing
factors such as reasonable foreseeability and the degree of frustration, it is inevitable that different courts at different times within
the same jurisdiction will vary considerably in their willingness
to apply the doctrine. Moreover, this variation is widened by the
courts' frequent failure to understand the doctrine. 56 Frustration
is not a doctrine which can easily be said to have been substantially
Nat'l Ass'n, 107 Ore. 162, 214 Pac. 377 (1923); Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 601, 126 N.Y.Supp.
135 (App. T. 1910). The remaining holdings accepting the frustration principle were Patch
v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945); 20th Century
Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944); Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal.
App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942); Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 566, 147 So. 862 (1933); O'Neill
v. Derderian, 1!18 Misc. 488, 246 N.Y.Supp. 341 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1930); State Realty Co. v.
Greenfield, 110 Misc. 270, 161 N.Y.Supp 511 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1920); McCullough Realty
Co. v. Laemmle Film Serv., 181 Iowa 594, 165 N.W. 33 (1917).
151 The writer has considered decisions by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals as decisions
by courts of last resort. The decisions of the courts of last resort are Swift Canadian Co. v.
Banet, 224 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1955); Bardons &: Oliver v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 123 N.Y.S.2d
633 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 748, 88 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 622, 93
N.E.2d 915 (1950) (frustrated promiser denied return of down payment on chattels although no indication that promisee had been damaged by farmer's failure to accept delivery); Frazier v. Collins, 300 Ky. 18, 187 S.W.2d 816 (1945); Leonard v. Autocar Sales &:
Serv. Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N.E.2d 477 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 804 (1946); Nickolopulos
v. Lehrer, 132 N.J.L. 461, 40 A.2d 794, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945); Wood v. Bartolino,
48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944); Kunkel Auto Supply Co. v. Leech, 139 Neb. 516, 298
N.W. 150 (1941); Retail Merchants' Business Expansion Co. v. Randall, 103 Vt. 268, 153
Atl. 357 (1931); Moreland v. Credit Guide Publishing Co., 255 Mass. 469, 152 N.E. 62
(1926); McLarren v. Spalding, 2 Cal. 510 (1852). The remaining decisions are Kollsman v.
Detzel, 184 Misc. 1048, 55 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945); Direct Realty Co. v. Birnbaum,
46 N.Y .S.2d 435 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944); Davidson v. Goldstein, 58 Cal. App.2d 909, 136
P.2d 655 (1943); Colonial Operating Corp. v. Hannan Sales &: Serv., 265 App. Div. 411,
39 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1943); Popper v. Centre Brass Works, 180 Misc. 1028, 43 N.Y.S.2d 107
(N.Y. City Ct. 1943); Fisher v. Lohse, 181 Misc. 149, 42 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Knorr
v. Jack&: Al, 179 Misc. 603, 38 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. T. 1942); Burke v. San Francisco Breweries, 21 Cal. App. 198, 131 Pac. 83 (1913); Kerley v. Mayer, 10 Misc. 718, 31 N.Y. Supp. 818
(C.P. 1895).
112 See note 8 supra.
113 See note 9 supra.
54 Compare Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912), with Kerley v.
Mayer, 10 Misc. 718, 31 N.Y. Supp. 818 (C.P. 1895).
511 Compare 20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944),
with Frazier v. Collins, 300 Ky. 18, 187 S.W.2d 816 (1945).
56 See Part IV infra.
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accepted in one jurisdiction and substantially rejected in another.
An excellent illustration of this is furnished by the decisions of
California courts which exhibit liberal application of the doctrine,57 substantial rejection of it,58 and numerous dicta suggesting
attitudes ranging from hostility5 9 to receptiveness. 60
Although the expression is little used in frustration cases, there
can be little doubt that "each case must stand upon its own facts." 01
While most courts are willing to apply the doctrine in cases involving total frustration, 62 judicial attitudes toward applicability of the
doctrine where the degree of frustration ranges from substantial
to severe is rather evenly divided. 63 Consequently it is particularly
appropriate to analyze the criticisms made of the doctrine by courts
who view it with suspicion and the rationales advanced for it by
courts who find its principles more appealing.
Ill.

CRITICISMS OF THE DOCTRINE

There are primarily two criticisms raised against the doctrine of
frustration, and, interestingly enough, they are basically incon57 E.g., 20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944);
Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942). Some of the California de•
cisions cite CAL. C1v. CoDE §1511 in support of the frustration doctrine. However, these
decisions are treated here as representing common law holdings because they do not rely
heavily on §1511 and because that section in reality does not deal with frustration, but
with impossibility of performance. See Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47,
50 (1944).
58 Davidson v. Goldstein, 58 Cal. App.2d 909, 136 P .2d 665 (1943); McLarren v.
Spalding, 2 Cal. 510 (1852).
59 Brown v. Oshiro, 68 Cal. App.2d 393, 156 P.2d 976 (1945); Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires,
25 Cal.2d 45, 153 P.2d 53 (1944).
60 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); U.S. Trading Corp. v. Newark
Grain Co., 56 Cal. App. 176, 205 Pac. 29 (1922).
61 The only frustration case known to this writer in which the court asserted this
approach to be the proper one is Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 741 (1945).
62 "It is only when the lessee is deprived without his fault of the use of the premises
for any purpose that rent ceases.•••" Kerley v. Mayer, 10 Misc. 718, 721, 31 N.Y.Supp.
818, 821 (C.P. 1895).
63 "Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained by
either party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and this
object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing
the frustration, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing
his promise unless a contrary intent appears." 1 R.EsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §288 (1932) .
. This section is not frequently cited by the courts. Cases holding in favor of the frustrated
promisor which cite §288 are Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 741 (1945); 20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88
(1944); Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942); Osius v. Barton,
109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933). Professor Anderson, in Frustration of Contract: A Re•
jected Doctrine, 3 DE PAULL. REv. 1, 8 (1953), argues persuasively that §288 did not reflect
the American Law Institute's considered judgment. For a codification of frustration
principles with respect to leases, see LA. CIV. CoDE ANN. §2699 (Dart 1945). See also
Drachsler, Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of
Supervening Illegality, 3 N.YL.F. 50, 83-4 (1957).
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sistent with each other. The first argument is that the doctrine's
application violates the parol evidence rule. The second is that
it is contrary to the principle that contracts should be construed by
the courts rather than remade by them. In Neuberg v. Avery F.
Payne Co. 64 a promisor sought to avoid normal contract damages
for failure to accept delivery of chattels on the ground that he could
not effect his original intention to export the chattels because of
subsequent governmental war regulations. Holding him liable,
the court observed, "The defendant buyer is bound by the terms
of the contract, and the court is not warranted in going outside the
contract to vary its terms." 65 This argument, however, does not
seem to have merit. The argument would be valid if the promisor
were asserting that the parties actually agreed that the risk of the
supervening event would be on the promisee, but this is obviously
not the case since the event itself was not foreseeable.
Frustration cases should involve no more than normal examination of the circumstances as an aid to interpretation; this is closely
analogous to cases of mistake. 66 The problem is not to find a
promise different from the one in the contract, but to determine the
scope which reasonable men, in the circumstances of the contracting parties, would have expected their promises to have.67 The
parol evidence argument is not frequently used; courts more frequently reject the doctrine of frustration because they believe its
application results in an unwarranted judicial remaking of the
contract. However, these objections are inconsistent, for if courts
which apply the frustration doctrine are simply relieving a promisor who actually intended to be bound, it cannot be said that
these courts have relied upon extrinsic evidence to determine and
effectuate the promisor's intent. 68
Although "[t]he purpose of a contract is to place the risks of
performance on the promisor . . . ," 69 and judicial reluctance to
subvert this purpose is not to be criticized, it cannot be said that
every application of the doctrine of frustration remakes a contract.
The most vuln.erable point of this objection is its initial assumptions that the literally unconditional promise actually went to the
04 37 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1942), retld, 265 App. Div. 1052, 41
05 Id. at 368.
66 See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§579-80, 590 (1951); Smit, Frustration

N.Y.S.2d 195 (1943).

of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 287, 310-12 (1958).
67 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§579-80, 590 (1951).
68 "[T]he purpose of proving [extrinsic facts] is not to vary the terms of the contract
itself, but to show that a state of facts has arisen which results in its termination." 20th
Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 942, 149 P .2d 88, 91 (1944).
oo Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).

llO

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

contingency of the frustrating event and that performance promised with reference to that contingency is thus being excused. Since
the frustrating event itself was neither foreseen nor reasonably
foreseeable, the promise was not in fact intended by the parties to
extend to such a contingency. 70 Moreover, it should be emphasized
that there are other policies, such as relief against hardship, which
may call for excuse of some promised performances.
IV.

RATIONALES FOR APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE

While criticisms leveled against the doctrine of frustration are
subject to serious question, it must also be conceded that courts
favoring the doctrine do not generally offer an adequate rationale. 71
A few courts avoid the theoretical marsh in which frustration
cases seem to become bogged by simply relieving the frustrated
party of the duty to perform his literally unconditional promise
without bothering to give the slightest hint of a rationale. 72 While
such cases would be authority for an assertion that the doctrine of
frustration has now "arrived," such an assertion is not borne out by
the cases. 73 Those cases barren of a frustration rationale, furthermore will offer little persuasiveness to a court faced with the problem as a matter of first impression.
Usually, however, courts favoring the doctrine of frustration
give one or more74 rationales for their position.

A.

Impossibility and "Foundation of the Contract"

Holdings that the promisor's performance has become impossible or that the frustrating event has destroyed the "foundation of
70 O'Neill v. Derderian, 138 Misc. 488, 491, 246 N.Y. Supp. 341, 344 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct.
1930). See also Levy v. Johnston &: Hunt, 224 Ill. App. 300, 306 (1922); Farlou Realty
Corp. v. Woodsam Associates, 49 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 52 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1944),
aff'd, 294 N.Y. 846, 62 N.E.2d 396 (1945); Raner v Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733
(1927); Kaiser v. Zeigler, 115 Misc. 281, 187 N.Y. Supp. 638 (App. T. 1921); Brunswick.Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing &: Malting Co., 98 Wash. 12, 167 Pac. 58 (1917);
Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 601, 609-10, 126 N.Y.Supp. 135 (App. T. 1910). Courts sometimes
say the promisor "assumed the risk" of the frustrating event, but it is clear that this is a
statement of a legal conclusion rather than a description of the promisor's actual intent.
See, e.g., McLarren v. Spalding, 2 Cal. 510 (1852).
71 For rationales used by European courts, see Smit, supra note 66.
72E.g., McCullough Realty Co. v. Laemmle Film Service, 181 Iowa 594, 165 N.W. 33
(1917). See also Gellert v. Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n, 107 Ore. 162, 214 Pac. 377 (1923);
Levy v. Johnston &: Hunt, 224 Ill. App. 300 (1922); Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing
Co., 198 App. Div. 708, 191 N.Y.Supp. 59 (1921).
73 See Part II supra.
74 It is not rare to find nvo or three different bases for the doctrine set forth in a
single opinion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P .2d 1027 (1942).
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the contract" embody the two most popular rationales. Sometimes
these two concepts are inextricably bound together.75

I. Impossibility. Courts espousing the impossibility rationale
seem to mean that the performance of the promisor has somehow
become impossible; this, of course, is not the case.76 The promisor
can perform, but the value of the promisee's counter performance
has been greatly diminished. One court, holding in favor of the
frustrated party, even suggested that the case was covered by the
jurisdiction's code provision on impossibility.77 Those accepting
the impossibility argument appear to assume that because a subsequent law has made unlawful the intended use of the leased premises it is also unlawful, and thus impossible, for the lessee to continue paying rent. 78 Few are the courts which seem to recognize
clearly that frustration cases can be decided with reference to the
principles of impossibility only by analogy at best.79 The reason
most courts do not distinguish these analytically different situations
stems from the simple fact that they think of both impossibility and
frustration as essentially doctrines by which, because of hardship,
a promisor is excused actually promised performance.80 By bringing to frustration cases all the limitations which have developed
about impossibility cases, courts favoring application of frustration
doctrine have accepted the premise of the basic argument against
75 "[W]herc the performance depends upon the continued existence of a thing
which is assumed as a basis of the agreement, the destruction of the thing by the enactment of a Jaw terminates the obJigation." Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 451, 60
So. 876, 878 (1912).
76 The impossibility rationale is sometimes characterized by stating that the "subject
matter of the contract" or "that which performance was dependent upon" has been
destroyed. These formulations also have strong overtones of the "destruction of the foundation" rationale. See e.g., Nickolopulos v. Lehrer, 132 N.J.L. 461 40 A.2d 794, cert. denied,
325 U.S. 876 (1945); Wood v. BartoJino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944). See also note 75
supra.
7120th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944), citing
CAL. CIV. CoDE §1511; note 57 supra. "The essential element in every case involving frustration is impossibility of performance." 119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190
Misc. 123, 125, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (Sup. Ct. 1947), affd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1949). The leading English frustration case, Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740,
reJied for its decision upon Taylor v. CaldweU, 3 B. &: S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863),
which is an impossibility case. There are, of course, a few cases which could legitimately
be considered either frustration or impossibility cases. Temporary impossibility, for
instance, can cause such a change in expectations that a frustration situation arises. See,
e.g., Pacific Trading Co. v. Mouton Rice Milling Co., 184 F.2d 141 (8th Cir. 1950). See also
note 6 supra. Temporary impossibility cases have not been considered frustration cases,
however, for purposes of this comment.
78E.g., O'Neill v. Derderian, 138 Misc. 488,246 N.Y.Supp. 341 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1930).
70 A clear recognition of the distinction is found in Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 153
P.2d 47 (1944), supra notes 33 and 57.
so See note 33 supra. See also Smit, supra note 66.
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the doctrine, and have set a much more harsh standard for relief
of the literally unconditional promise than would the parties
themselves had they foreseen the risk of the frustrating event.81
2. "Foundation." The most difficult to describe of the various rationales urged in support of the doctrine of frustration is one
which may be characterized by the phrase "destruction of the
foundation of the contract." The basis of this concept is the
assumption by both parties that a particular event would take
place82 or a particular thing-8 3 or state of facts would continue or
cease.84 When the frustrating event causes circumstances to become
other than those presumably assumed by the parties, the foundation of the contract is destroyed, and, consequently, the contract is
also. This rationale appears in a wide variety of conceptual and
verbal forms. 85 The frustrated purpose itself has even been proffered as the contract's foundation. Thus in one of the "Cancelled
Yacht Race" cases,86 Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage
Co.,87 the court concluded, " . . . [T]he situation, as it turns out,
has frustrated the entire design on which is grounded the promise.
• . . The object in mutual contemplation having failed, plaintiff
cannot exact the stipulated payment." 88 This rationale has the
inherent weakness of an "all or nothing" approach. It is, therefore, not surprising that those American courts which think in
terms of "destroyed foundation" should also deem the automatic
result of a frustrating event to be a destroyed contract.89 Thus because the form of relief, if it is granted, will be unresponsive to the
individual circumstances of the case,90 this approach tends to lead
courts to impose a much more harsh standard for relief against the
frustrated party than would have been imposed by the parties
themselves had they considered the matter when they made their
contract.
81 "While it is undoubtedly true that the tendency of the law is toward the enlargement of the defense of impossibility, such process should be regarded with great caution,
since there is danger that courts, in their desire to relieve parties in hard cases, may go
too far. The province of courts is to construe and enforce contracts, not to make or modify
them." Retail Merchants' Business Expansion Co. v. Randall, 103 Vt. 268, 271, 153 Atl.
1157, 358 (1931) (a frustration case).
82E.g., Raner v. Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927).
SB E.g., Abbaye v. U.S. Motor Cab. Co., 71 Misc. 454,128 N.Y.Supp. 697 (App. T. 1911).
84 E.g., Straus v. Kazemekas, 100 Conn. 581, 124 Atl. 234 (1924).
85 Compare, e.g., the cases cited in notes 82-84 supra.
86 Note 49 supra.
87170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y.Supp. 179 {1915).
88 Id. at 485.
89 Complete discharge of all rights and duties under the contract is the only remedy
applied to frustration cases by most courts. See Part V infra.
90 See Part V infra.
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"Implied Condition"

Both the impossibility and frustration rationales are frequently
stated in terms of an "implied condition." In Patch v. Solar
Corp.,01 for instance, the court remarked, "Whether you call it
impossibility of performance or frustration, the result is the same.
In either event the court will imply a condition excusing both
parties from performance. . . ." 02 Sometimes, however, a court
will assert an "implied condition" in a manner which does not seem
merely to be a way of stating an impossibility or foundation rationale. 03 These varying uses of "implied conditions" lead to the
conclusion that there is a separate rationale for the doctrine of frustration which may be called the "implied condition" rationale.
Indeed, one court has asserted that an alternative name for the doctrine of frustration itself is the "doctrine of implied condition." 94
Certainly this rationale, if it is one, at least has the merit of describing with fair accuracy what the courts do when they apply the frustration doctrine, however defective it may be as an explanation for
why they do it. In fact there is no case more accurately describing
the doctrine than 119 Fifth Avenue, Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co.95
which characterized the doctrine as one " ... based upon the theory
of an implied term which the law imputes to the parties in order to
regulate a situation which, in the eyes of the law, the parties themselves would have regulated by agreement if the necessity had
occurred to them." 06 It thus seems that courts favoring the doctrine of frustration are developing a new constructive condition,
an implied condition that a promisor's dominant purpose not have
been frustrated. Unfortunately, however, there is nothing in this
rationale which indicates when, and on what bases, the implication
of such a condition is proper.
91149 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945).
92 Id. at 560. E.g., the implied condition approach used in conjunction with the foundation rationale in West v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 106 A.2d 427
(1954), A similar coalescence of "implied condition" and "foundation of the contract"
is seen in English decisions. See Smit, supra note 66, at 304-5.
03 In one of the "cancelled yacht race" cases, Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel
Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y.Supp. 179 (1915), the contract was said to be
subject to the implied condition that contestants for the race be named.
04 Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
05190 Misc. 123, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d.
430 (1949).
96 Id. at 125, 73 NY.S.2d at 776. The decisions are not free of suggestion that the
term is implied in fact rather than implied in law. See, e.g., Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 601,
609-10, 126 N.Y. Supp. 135, 139-40 (App.T. 1910). Such a view is unrealistic, however, for
by definition the frustrating event was not foreseen.
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C. Failure of Consideration
Among the frequently used rationales the one which makes the
most sense may be characterized "failure of consideration." The
heart of the frustrated party's complaint is that because of supervening events he is getting from promisee something which is in form
only that for which he contracted. The description of frustration
cases as involving "actual but not literal failure of consideration" 97
is an accurate one. The jump from "literal" to "actual" failure of
consideration should not be an insuperably great one for a court
endowed with the flexible principles of the common law and
equity. It may strain credulity to say, as did the court in 20th
Century Lites v. Goodman,9 8 that the lessee of a neon sign no longer
has the display for which he contracted because he cannot turn it
on at night. 99 However, this is mild fiction compared to saying,
as many courts do, that it has become impossible for the lessee to
continue paying the stipulated rent.100
Despite the analogical appropriateness of the failure of consideration rationale, courts applying frustration doctrine do not
commonly mention it. This is particularly interesting since the
constructive condition of exchange could fit so easily into the "implied term" approach popular with the courts. Equally striking,
in light of the factual similarity of mistake and frustration cases,101
is the failure of any court known to this writer to have suggested an
analogy to the principles of mistake as a rationale for frustration
relief.102 The inability of most courts to distinguish between impossibility and frustration103 compels the conclusion that the lack
of general judicial acceptance of either a failure of consideration or
a mistake analogy rationale stems from a questionable assumption
that the problem is not what the agreement actually involved, but
simply whether, because of hardship, promised performance shall
be excused.10!
97 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
98 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P .2d 88 (1944).
99 See also Ask Mr. Foster Travel Service v. Tauck Tours,

181 Misc. 91, 43 N.Y.S.2d
674 (Sup. Ct. 1943). In Hizington v. Eldred Ref. Co., 235 App. Div. 486, 257 N.Y.Supp. 464
(1932), a lessee was held not obligated for further rent when government regulation
made it illegal to continue to operate his gasoline station on the leased premises. The
court called this a "constructive eviction," but such a position is not justified by reference
to principles of property law. See 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§92, 141-2, 145 (3d ed. 1939).
100 See Part IV-A supra.
101 See note 25 supra.
102 On the use of this rationale in Europe, see Smit, supra note 66, at 290, 301-2, !l05.
103 See Part IV-A supra.
104 See Part m supra.
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Relief Against Hardship

While relief against hardship may be the core of frustration
doctrine to many courts, they evidently do not like to admit this.
Lloyd v. Murphy 105 is the only frustration case knmvn to this ·writer
in which relief against hardship is expressly given as a basis for
the doctrine of frustration. It is probable that courts shy from
discussing relieving against hardship because to do so would put
them too squarely in conflict with the opposite principle that contracts are to be enforced rather than relieved.106 Terms like "impossibility," "implied condition," and "failure of consideration,"
with their air of precedent, or a concept like "destruction of the
foundation," with its apparent logic that something falls when that
upon which it stands falls, seem to allow a court to relieve hardship
·without mentioning it. Any emphasis upon relieving hardship
as a rationale for frustration doctrines would openly require a
balancing of the desire for certainty of contract 1vith the sympathy
for the frustrated party. Since this would, no doubt, have the effect
of allowing application of the doctrine only in the cases of severest frustration, the standard for relief against performance of
the literally unconditional promise would be much more harsh
than the parties themselves would have set had they considered
the risk of the frustrating event.

E.

Gap Filling

It thus appears that American courts favoring the doctrine of
frustration of purpose have not generally developed an adequate
rationale for its use. At the base of the theoretical weaknesses in
the approach of the courts to frustration, furthermore, is the assumption that the problem in a frustration case is whether to excuse a promisor from an obligation he voluntarily undertook. This
writer has already indicated his essential disagreement with that
assumption. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the rationale
for frustration relief which this writer considers to be the most
sound has its starting point in a diametrically opposite assumption.
This opposite premise is simply that the parties did not contract
with reference to the unforeseen frustrating event; therefore, the
event's effect upon the rights and duties of the parties under the
contract is not provided for in the contract. The lack of provision
1011 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P .2d
100 See Part III supra.

47 (1944), supra note 33.
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in the contract for the contingency of the frustrating event may
be called a "gap," and the rationale which flows from discerning
such a gap is generally designated "gap filling." 107
The court in a frustration case has before it parties who, after
creating certain legal relations between themselves by contract,
have been forced by supervening events into a situation not covered
by their contract and, hence, into the necessity of adjusting their
relations with reference to the unprovided-for situation. This is
the thrust of the gap-filling doctrine; since the parties cannot agree
on this adjustment, the court must fill the gaps for them. The
court must either fill the gaps or, refusing to do so, leave the
parties as it finds them. Such refusal does not prevent the parties
from arriving at a situation different from the one for which they
contracted, but simply causes the adjustment of their rights and
duties with reference to the new situation to be determined by
chance factors such as whether an installment payment was made
a day before the frustrating event or a day after. When a court
proceeds to apply the doctrine of frustration of purpose it is merely
affirming that it, rather than chance, should fill in the gaps.
The basic criticism of the gap-filling rationale is that it calls
for the court partially to "make a contract"; this the courts are
often thought powerless to do.108 But courts do have the power
to "make contracts" in the sense intended by the criticism; 100 such
power is asserted every time a court finds a contract subject to a
condition implied in law.
While there is little express authority for the gap-filling rationale in American decisions110 its acceptance is implicit in holdings that the contract actually did not go to the contingency of the
frustrating event or that the contract is subject to an implied condition.111 The limited American use of the gap-filling rationale
is unfortunate because, unlike the rationales which generally are
used by the courts, gap filling proceeds from the realistic assumptions that the parties did not contract with reference to the frustrating contingency and that, whether it likes it or not, the court
must now adjust the rights and duties of the parties with reference
107 See generally Sm.it, supra note 66; 6 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1331 (1951).
108 See note 81 supra.
109 Smit, supra note 66, at 313-15; 6 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1331 (1951).
110 Acceptance of the doctrine is growing in England. Smit, supra note 66, at
lllE.g., 119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123, 73 N.Y.S.2d

306-7.
774 Sup.
Ct. 1947), affd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 NY.S.2d 430 (1949); Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.
2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942).
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to a situation about which their contract is silent.112 By focusing
upon frustration as involving matters not considered by the parties,
courts may be expected to evolve a standard of relief more nearly
approximating that which the parties themselves would have imposed had they considered the risk of the frustrating event.

V.
A.

FORMS OF RELIEF

Discharge of All Obligations

The courts have not generally matched their ingenuity in
finding a wide variety of rationales for giving relief to a frustrated
party with a similar inventiveness of forms of relief to be given.
In all but three of the twenty-nine holdings cited earlier as relieving the frustrated party, the court merely declared all rights
and duties under the contract terminated by the frustrating
event.113 The courts appear unable to evolve any alternative to
simple discharge of the contract.
Discharge of all obligations is undoubtedly the proper remedy
in many cases. If under a frustrated service contract, for example,
the promisor has made compensation at the contract rate for the
services performed prior to the frustration, and the promisee has
incurred no reliance expenses other than in connection with the
services which have been compensated, there is nothing for the
court to do except to declare that the frustrating event ended the
promisee's duty to continue the service and the promisor's duty to
pay for them.11 4 But this is not always true, and there are cases
which suggest that courts have sometimes been more automatic
than equitable or reasonable in giving complete discharge as their
only relief. Even arbitration clauses, by which the parties have
presumably agreed upon a method for adjusting their difficulties,
have been held to be defeated with the rest of the contract.115 In
112 Smit, supra note
113 The twenty-nine

66, at 315.
holdings are cited in notes 48-50 supra. The particular three referred to are Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945);
O'Neill v. Derderian, 138 Misc. 488, 246 N.Y.Supp. 341 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1930); Gellert v.
Bank of California, Nat'! Ass'n, 107 Ore. 162, 214 Pac. 377 (1923). In addition to these
three holdings, relief other than complete discharge was given in West v. Peoples First
Nat'l Dank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 106 A.2d 427 (1954). The statement made in the
text should be qualified in one respect. A lessee will be required to continue paying rent
after the frustrating event until he surrenders possession. See, e.g., 140 West Thirty-Fourth
St. Corp. v. Davis, 158 Misc. 470, 285 N.Y. Supp. 957 (App. T. 1931).
114 See Ask Mr. Foster Travel Service v. Tauck Tours, 181 Misc. 91, 43 N.Y.S.2d 674
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
1111 Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P .2d 1027 (1942). But see Petition
of Prouvost Lefebrve of Rhode Island, 105 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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20th Century Lites v. Goodman116 the lease of a neon sign was declared terminated because war regulations prohibited lighting the
sign at night despite the lessor's argument that, in view of his manufacturing and installation costs and the fact that the prohibition
had since been repealed, the lease should only be suspended for
the period of the prohibition.11 7 The court did not even consider
such questions as whether the lessor had recouped his costs or
how the parties would have allocated the risk of such losses had
the possibility of the frustration occurred to them. Decisions of
this nature not only reach inequitable results118 but, by suggesting
that the only relief possible under the doctrine of frustration is
the drastic one of complete discharge of all obligations between
the parties, undoubtedly cause uncertain courts to be more reluctant to accept the doctrine. Frequently courts which refuse to relieve the frustrated party emphasize at the same time their lack
of sympathy with the inequitable position taken by the promisee.119
It is reasonable to suggest that there would be fewer of these cases
if the courts created some alternative forms of relief.
This general inability to provide any relief other than full
termination of the contract is traceable to two basic judicial attitudes criticized in the preceding section of this comment - the idea
that contracts have a "foundation" which has been destroyed by
the frustrating event and the assumption that the courts cannot
"make contracts." It is difficult to understand how a court can
assert that it has no power to make a contract and at the same time
insert into a contract the most drastic provision possible, an "implied condition" that the contract be terminated on the occurrence
of the frustrating event.120
116 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P .2d 88
117 Ibid. The failure to give any

(1944).
weight to the lessor's argument for suspension is
particularly interesting because the court cited in support of its relief of the lessee a
code provision dealing with impossibility which called for performance to be relieved by
supervening events only "to the extent to which they operate." CAL. Cxv. CODE §1511.
118 Simply discharging the contract and leaving the parties as the court finds them has
been characterized as a rule suited for "tricksters, gamblers and thieves." Cantiare San
Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., [1924] A.C. 226, 259.
119 E.g., Fischer v. Lohse, 181 Misc. 149, 42 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1943). In Europe
considerable use is made of various rationales based upon a requirement of good faith be•
tween contracting parties. It is deemed a breach of a condition of good faith and an
"abuse of right" or "e.xploitation" to demand literal performance of the frustrated
promiser. Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 287, 292-3, 296, 297-8, 301-2 (1958).
120 See, e.g., Kaiser v. Zeigler, 115 Misc. 281, 187 N.Y.Supp. 638 (App. T. 1921).
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Equitable Adjustment

I. Theoretical Basis. The failure of judicial flexibility in
the area of remedies for frustration cases stems primarily from inadequate rationales for relief rather than from a lack of power to
give relief. The basic merit of the gap-filling rationale in this
connection is obvious. By accurately describing what the courts
are doing when they give any form of relief in a frustration case,
gap filling suggests, in turn, what they can do. Once the court
views its function in frustration cases to be the filling of gaps left
by the parties, there is no reason to limit the solution to the complete termination of obligations between the parties. "The gap
filling doctrine clearly warrants equitable adjustment of the rights
and duties of the parties short of discharge, if prevailing notions
of good faith and fair dealing so require."121
Writers in this field are almost unanimous in urging a flexible
remedial approach to the problems of frustration.122 The formula
for equitable adjustment in frustration cases is usually stated in
terms which indicate that the court should attempt to arrange the
rights and duties of the parties in a manner similar to that which
the parties themselves, as reasonable men, probably would have
provided had they considered the possibility of the supervening
event.123
It is equitable adjustment, rather than simple termination of
all obligations, that most preserves the sanctity of contract, for
the whole approach of equitable adjustment is to help the parties
achieve the attainment of their original contractual purposes.
2. Acceptance. There is some support for the equitable adjustment remedy among American cases. It is implicit in the
liberal approach of those courts which use "implied conditions."124
In addition, four courts125 have applied the remedy. Three of
121 Smit, supra note 119, at 314. See also 6 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §§280-3 (1951).
122 Ibid. See also Drachsler, Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of
Remedies in Cases of Supervening Illegality, 3 N.Y.L.F. 50, 58 (1957); DAWSON, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 112 (1951). Considerable use is made of the remedy in Europe. See Smit,
supra note 119, at 299; Drachsler, supra at 63, 65-70; Zepos, Frustration of Contract in
Comparative Law and in the New Greek Civil Code of 1946, lI Moo. L. REv. 36, 43-4 (1948).
123 Sometimes the formula is worded as if the court should attempt to determine
what the parties would have provided had they foreseen the event itself, as distinguished
from merely foreseeing the possibility or risk of the event. But this is unrealistic for had the
parties in fact foreseen the event it is probable that there would never have been a con•
tract. See Smit, supra note 119, at 313.
124£,g., 119 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 190 Misc. 123, 73 N.Y.S.2d 774
(Sup. Ct. 1947), afj'd, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
12IS See note 113 supra.
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them decreed restitution. O'Neill v. Derderian126 simply allowed
the frustrated lessee to get his security back upon vacating the
premises. In Gellert v. Bank of California, National Ass'n127 the
estate of the decedent remitter was allowed to recover from the
drawer bank money paid it by the decedent for the drafts he had
intended to remit. West v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust
Co.128 involved a more complicated problem. The parties, one of
whom was a real estate developer, had entered into a joint venture
for the development of a certain tract mvned by the other. The
real estate developer was to execute the project and to look solely
to the proceeds from sale of the land for recoupment of his expenses. Despite this provision, when the venture was frustrated
by the condemnation of part of the tract, the court allowed the
developer to recover his expenses from the o,vner to the degree
that a benefit had been conferred upon the latter. The court's
solution gives reasonable weight both to the intent of the parties
that the developer assume the risk of losing his expenses and to
the fact that the parties had not, however, thought of the risk of
the severe type of frustration that resulted.
In the fourth frustration case to apply equitable adjustment,
Patch v. Solar Corp.,12 9 the licensee of a patent, who had spent
$100,000 in its promotion, was frustrated by war regulations that
prohibited manufacturing of the patented item. Rather than accept the patentee's argument that the license agreement terminated
because the licensee failed to pay the minimum royalty, the
court declared the license agreement to be in force with the royalty
merely suspended for the period of the prohibition. The court
said that in cases of frustration " ... the court will imply a condition excusing both parties from performance, and the contract
may be wholly dissolved or operation under the contract suspended,
depending upon the facts of the particular case."130 While minimum royalty provisions are expressly to achieve a degree of risk
assumption by the licensee, it is reasonable to assume that had the
parties considered the matter they would have inserted a clause
suspending performance for the duration of any total government
prohibition of the patent's use. This seems particularly probable
126138 Misc. 488, 245 N.Y.Supp. 341 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1930).
127107 Ore. 162, 214 Pac. 377 (1923).
12s 378 Pa. 275, 106 A.2d 427 (1954).
129149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945).
130 Id. at 560.
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for even if the patentee were to secure the return of the patent he
could make no more functional use of it than could the licensee.131
3. Suggested Extensions. While no case has given frustration
relief beyond discharge of obligation, suspension of obligation or
restitution of benefit conferred,132 this 1vriter sees no reason why,
within the principles of gap filling and equitable adjustment, a
court should be limited to such relief.133 In Raner v. Goldberg,13 4
for instance, a lessor was required to make considerable changes in
the premises in order for them to be useful to the lessee as a dance
hall. Although the lessee failed to get a permit to operate this dance
hall, the court held him to a continuing obligation to pay rent because he had in fact assumed the risk of such failure. Had this been
a true frustration case, however, this 1vriter believes it most reasonable to assume that the parties would have provided, had they considered the risk of frustration, that some of the cost of the lessor's
reliance be borne by the lessee in the event that frustration should
occur. The proper remedy would then have been to give the lessor
recovery for that amount. In Kaiserv. Zeigler,13 5 on the other hand,
a provision in the lease calling for the lessee to sell a certain brand
of beer indicated that the lessor had a real interest in his tenant operating a saloon rather than some other business. Had it been
necessary in that case for the lessee to make considerable changes
in the premises, and had the parties considered the risk of Prohibition, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the lessor would
have been willing to bear some of the costs of the lessee's reliance
in the event of frustration. The court in such a case should shape
its adjustment of the parties' rights and duties accordingly.136
Before there will be many holdings of this nature, however, it
will be necessary for courts to realize that through remedial in181 A suspension was also appropriate in this case in view of the fact that it appeared
at the time of the decision that the prohibition was about to end. Where it appears that
the effects of the frustrating event extend beyond the term of the contract, it is probably
better to terminate the contract, thus allowing the parties to change their position. See
20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944).
182 For further acceptance of the restitution principle, see 2 REsrATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs
§468 (1932).
133 On the extensiveness of adjustment of rights and duties which may be worked
by a court in Germany or Greece, see Smit, supra note 119, at 299; Zepos, supra note 122,
at 43-4.
134 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927).
185115 Misc. 281, 187 N.Y.Supp. 638 (App. T. 1921).
136 For a case with a strong dictum in support of allowing recovery of reliance expenses, see Gardiner Properties v. Samuel Leider &: Son, 279 App. Div. 470, 111 N.Y.S.2d
88 (1952).

122

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

flexibility in cases of frustration, based upon a feeling that the
courts cannot "make contracts," they are in effect not only "making a contract" but frequently making one unnecessarily divorced
from what the parties themselves would have intended.
CONCLUSION

Upon the assumption that the doctrine of frustration of purpose in contract operates to relieve promisors from hard contracts, the courts have built into the doctrine certain requisites
for its application. Primarily they demand that the frustrating
event not have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting and that it have worked a basic frustration of purpose.
Nevertheless, even thus limited the doctrine of frustration has
not yet received substantial acceptance in many states. The doctrine would be more broadly applied if courts would recognize
that frustration problems involve an omission - a gap - in the
contract. Furthermore, the desirable effect of such an approach
would be the likelihood of more flexible relief which could more
closely approximate the result for which the parties themselves
would have provided had the risk of frustration occurred to them.

T. Ward Chapman, S.Ed.

